Abstract-Providing functionalities that allow online social network users to manage in a secure and private way the publication of their information and/or resources is a relevant and far from trivial topic that has been under scrutiny from various research communities. In this work, we provide a framework that allows users to define highly expressive access policies to their resources in a way that the enforcement does not require the intervention of a (trusted or not) third party. This is made possible by the deployment of a newly defined cryptographic primitives that provides -among other things -efficient access revocation and access policy privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs from now on) are nowadays used by hundreds of millions of users as the primary way of interacting and sharing information and digital resources, as examples such as Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn and many others OSNs testify. As the widespread adoption of OSNs increases and diversifies into various contexts (such as corporate OSNs), the need for mechanisms protecting and regulating the access of users' sensitive resources is becoming paramount. The totality of OSNs allows users to specify -usually in a rather limited way -policies protecting their privacy and the confidentiality of their sensitive data/resources. In this way, access to such data is restricted to the users that satisfy such policies. Usually, the enforcement of the users' specified policies is delegated to the central authority that manages the entire OSN, and this state of affairs assumes -of course -a large degree of trust in such central authority. This may be not acceptable when the shared resources are highly sensitive (as, for example, in the case of healthcare-related data). A (quite radical) solution would delegate the entire management (storage and access control) of resources to their legitimate owner. This is clearly not feasible in a real world setting.
In this work, we propose a framework for publishing resources and for establishing social links over an OSN that gives the owner of the resource a fine-grained control on who can access the resources without having to trust the manager of the OSN. In our framework, the task of the OSN manager is reduced to that of providing reliable storage of the resources. Specifically, in our framework a user can establish a social relationship with other users and "for each such relationship" can specify the type of resources that can be accessed. In addition, for each published resource the owner can specify an access policy specifying the type of relationship needed for a user to access it. Enforcement of access policies is guaranteed by means of novel cryptographic primitive, Distance-Based Revokable Attribute Encryption (DBRA in short, see Section III), for which we give an efficient implementation based on the Hidden Vector Encryption of [1] and the Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption of [2] . Roughly speaking, in our framework for OSN based on DBRA, the establishment of a social link between two users involves the transfer of a set of keys that depend on the type of relationship established and, in turn, determine which of the resources of one user can be accessed by the other user. On the other hand, publishing a resource res involves publishing an appropriately encrypted version of res. We stress that restricted decryption keys are transferred only when a new link is established (or removed).
II. OUR FRAMEWORK
We assume that each user u owns a set R u = {r 1 Once a user u has defined the appropriate access control policy pol res for resource res, he computes the encryption r of the resource res using the DBRA scheme, described in Section III, and (apart the resource res, of course) the policy pol res . Then, the user u publishesr on the (possibly untrusted) OSN repository. After having published the encrypted version of the resource res, the user u propagates -according to the access policy pol res -to his friends u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u l that satisfy the access control policy pol res (and only to them) the corresponding decryption keys k u1 , k u2 , . . . , k u l . Once published on the OSN repository, the metadata related to the encrypted resourcer es (including, for example, the owner's identifier) can be searched by all the OSN's users. In this way, once a OSN user u -without any connection with user u -is willing to access resource res, u sends a link creation request to u. Such request contains the attributes of u as well. Upon checking whether the attributes of u satisfy the access policy pol res , u decides upon the creation of a friendship link with u . In the positive case, u computes a decryption key k u and sends it to u . Of course, a user has as many decryption keys as sensitive resource it is entitled to access. We call such set of decryption keys the key ring of user u. (( x, d ), ( y, d) ) to be true iff for each i ∈ [ ] it holds that y i = or x i = y i and d ≤ d . In other words, the vectors must match for all positions i in which y is not and the ciphertext must have a larger distance than the key's. The decryption algorithm DBRA.Dec takes as input a ciphertext ct and a restricted decryption key key and, if the attributes, ( x, d ), of ct and, ( y, d) of key satisfy the Match predicate then the plaintext M associated with ct is returned. If the attribute vectors do no match, then DBRA.Dec fails and returns ⊥. We stress that the decryption algorithm is oblivious to the attributes of x and y associated with ciphertext and key, respectively, which need not to be available in clear to the decryption algorithm. We observe that the master secret key msk can be seen as the restricted secret key associated with the all-attribute vector and distance 0.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC
In addition to the above algorithm, a DBRA scheme includes a key delegation algorithm DBRA.Delegate that takes as input a restricted decryption key for ( y, d) and an integer d > d and returns a key for pair ( y, d ). We stress that the DBRA.Delegate algorithm need not to know the attribute vector y associated with the key key being delegated.
Finally, the DBRA.Revoke algorithm is used to revoke encryption keys. More specifically, the DBRA.Revoke algorithm takes as input an encryption key pk with the associated master secret key msk and a sequence of old ciphertexts ct 1 Revoke algorithm is that the new ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintexts with respect to the new key as the old ciphertexts did with respect to the old key and, similarly, the new restricted decryption keys have, with respect to the new encryption and master secret key, the same attribute that the old keys had with respect to the old encryption and master secret key.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF A SECURE DBRASCHEME
The DBRA scheme is defined upon Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [1] and Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) [3] schemes whose presentations we omit, due to space limitations. We briefly illustrate how such schemes are used in the definition of our DBRA scheme. The DBRA.KG algorithm calls the algorithms HVE.KG and HIBE.KG to obtain the pairs (HVE.msk, pk) and (HIBE.msk, HIBE.pk) and sets msk = ((HVE.msk, HIBE.msk) and pk = (HVE.pk, HIBE.pk). , key I ) . The DBRA.Revoke procedure calls the revocation procedure for the HIBE system. It is possible to prove that the DBRA scheme defined in this way is correct and secure assuming the correctness and security of the underlying HVE and HIBE schemes.
V. ACCESS POLICY ENFORCEMENT
We now describe the protocols executed by the users to perform the functionalities introduced in Section II. We assume that the user u executing the protocols for protecting her/his resources has defined an ordered set C u = {cond 1 , . . . , cond n } of the conditions which she/he is going to use in the definition of the policies protecting the sensitive resources owned by her/him. We recall from Section II that a condition is an expression of the form res.attr pred val.
User Enrollment: We assume that the OSN has fixed a DBRA scheme and a symmetric key encryption scheme SKE. Upon enrolling into the OSN, a user A generates a pair (pk, msk) of encryption and master secret key for DBRA by running algorithm DBRA.KG on input the maximum distance d max . The encryption key is published in a publicly-accessible repository whereas the master secret key is kept by A in a private repository.
Resource publication and access: The encrypted version of the sensitive resource is published on an untrusted repository. As such, we cannot assume the repository enforces the access control policy associated with the resource. Rather, the access control policy Pol is encoded by a policy pair ( x, d) consisting of an attribute vector x and of a maximum distance d and is used by the DBRA.Enc to produce the encrypted version of the resource which is published on the social network. The attribute vector x consists of n components with the i-th component representing the value that the i-th condition cond i ∈ C u must assume for the access control policy to be satisfied. More in details, the publication of a resource res protected by access policy Pol encoded by policy pair ( x Pol , d Pol ) is carried out by performing the following three steps: 1. User A generates a random secret key sk res for symmetric encryption scheme SKE by running algorithm SKE.KG; 2. resource res is encrypted with key sk by running algorithm SKE.Enc on input sk res and res obtaining the permanent ciphertext ct res for resource res; 3. secret key sk is encrypted using encryption key pk with policy pair ( x Pol , d Pol ) and algorithm DBRA.Enc to obtain the revocable ciphertextct res for resource res. The pair of permanent ciphertext and revocable ciphertext (ct res ,ct res ) are sent to the public repository. A user that wants to access a resource res with policy pair ( x, d) using a restricted decryption key with policy pair ( y, d ) such that Match (( x, d), ( y, d ) ) = true first decrypts the revocable ciphertextct res using algorithm DBRA.Dec and thus obtaining secret key sk res and then uses sk res as input to SKE.Dec to decrypt the permanent ciphertext ct res .
Link creation and revocation: In this section we describe how user A can establish link to user B and assign to the link policy pair ( y, d ) where y is a vector overΣ and d > 0 is an integer. The vector y encodes the privileges that A is granting to B. Specifically, y has one component for each condition cond i ∈ C u ; if y i = then B can access only resource for which cond i has value y i ; instead if y i = then B can access a resource regardless of its value for cond i . User A runs algorithm DBRA.Derive on input the master secret key msk computed at enrollment and pair ( y, d) to obtain a restricted decryption key key A←B that is sent to user B along with encryption key pk. The restricted decryption key key A←B will be used by B to access all resources published by A. In addition, upon receiving the pair (pk, key) user B propagates the restricted decryption key to all users user C for which B has established a link. Specifically, suppose B has established a link with policy pair ( z, e). Then, using the DBRA.Delegate algorithm B derives a key with policy pair ( y, d + e) and sends it to C. C does the same with all her neighbors until maximum distance d max is reached.
When user A wants to revoke her link with user B, she executes the DBRA.Revoke algorithm on input the encryption key pk, the master secret key msk, the revocable ciphertexts ct res , for all published resources res, and the restricted decryption keys key A←C for all C = B for which A has established a link. As output, A obtains a new public key pk N , a new master secret key msk N , new revocable ciphertexts ct 
VI. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed access control model and of the related enforcement protocols, we developed a prototype application providing the features described in the previous sections. The prototype has been developed in Java 6 using the jPBC and the BouncyCastle cryptographic libraries and it is deployed as a Facebook application. The application architecture follows the clientserver paradigm A user interacts through a web interface with the client module, which is in charge of generating the user keys and of the encryption/decryption of the resources. The user is allowed to define the access policy to be associated to the resource which she/he is currently uploading on Facebook. Upon the upload in the client module of the resource, such module execute the steps described in paragraph on resource publication and it sends the encrypted resource to the server module, which is in charge of storing it in the resource repository. The client module is also in charge of retrieving the list of friends of the executing user and, after a check against their attributes, generates the search keys required to access the uploaded resources. Further, upon receiving a search key, the client module propagates such key to the owner's Facebook friends, following the steps described for creating a link. The purpose of the server module is to store the encrypted resources, alongside with metadata such as the resource names and the references to owners, and to provide a common interface to search and retrieve them. Note that the decryption of the resource is performed on the client side. Thus, no cryptographic material -such as keys -is available to the server module, other than the encrypted resources.
VII. RELATED WORK
Access control in OSNs is a relatively new research area in which several access control models and related mechanisms have been presented, aiming to overcome the restrictions of the mechanisms provided by current OSNs (see [4] for a survey). One of the common characteristics of almost all the defined access control models is that access control is relationship-based, that is, authorized users are denoted on the basis of constraints on the relationships the requester should have with other network users. In particular, such constraints refer to the depth of the relationship and/or its type. As an example, in [5] the authors present a framework for OSN access control that allows the definition of suitable policies with respect to the relationships occurring among the users and the corresponding associated trust values. In the recent years,several work have been done to the definition of cryptographic schemes and protocols to store sensitive data over untrusted storage. Examples of such efforts are shown in [6] , [7] . Moreover, in [8] and in [9] are presented mechanisms for information sharing and propagation using ABE schemas.
The introduction of cryptographic primitives in OSN in order to enhance the privacy and the security of shared data is an active research topic. In [10] , the authors propose an alternative architecture for a distributed OSN, in which a four-layer client-server deploys cryptographic primitives and sandboxed environments to safely share and access information.
The Persona framework: The work with which we share more common traits is Persona [11] . In it, the authors present an access control framework for OSN using an ABE schema.
The main differences between Persona's and our approach can be summarized in the following four points: (i) more expressive access policy definition language. Our access policy language allows the definition of more comprehensive access control policies. First of all, in our policy definition language it is possible to express distance constraints. (ii) Access delegation. Using our framework allows a user to delegate access to certain resources to her/his contacts, according to the propagation limits defined. (iii) Efficient access revocation. Our framework allows a user to efficiently revoke all the generated keys allowing access to a given resource, revoking the delegation as well. (iv) Privacy of the access control policy. Using our framework, the policy which protects a resource is known only to the owner.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have introduced a framework allowing users of a OSN to express and enforce access control policies for sharing sensitive information/resources without relying on a possibly untrusted third party, except for the storage of the encrypted information/resource. Our solution is based on a novel attribute-based encryption scheme and offers several advantages with respect to the existing literature, such as the possibility of expressing private access policies based on the topology of the OSN graph, with efficient revocation. We have implemented our framework as a Facebook application demonstrating the viability of our approach and showing that we can reach high levels of privacy with reasonable performances. As further work we are currently working on a fully distributed OSN setting in which we plan to deploy the framework proposed in this work. Subsequently we plain to perform more extensive experiments and to test other cryptographic primitives.
